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July 2024
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Friday, July 12, 2024
- All dayArt Exhibit: Origins & Forgotten in TimeExhibits featuring painter Catie Lewis and photographer Mallorie Ostrowitz
- All dayOpen Air 2024 Sculpture ExhibitionThe exhibiting artists are Jenny Carpenter, the CoyWolf Collective, Dan Devine, Walter Early, Johanna Jackson, Cara Lynch, R. Douglass Rice, Sebastian Shames, Margaret Roleke and Martha Willette Lewis. Plan your visit to explore these exciting sculptures and their relationship to the coastal landscape.
- All dayUConn Summer Horseback Riding
- All dayUConn Summer Horseback Riding
- All dayUConn Summer Horseback Riding
- 8:00 AM8h 30mNew Employee Orientation Day OneUConn Health's Day 1 new employee orientation is a comprehensive introduction to the organization's mission, values, and culture. It covers essential information on benefits, policies, and resources, ensuring a smooth transition for new hires. Sessions highlight UConn Health's commitment to excellence in patient care, research, and education. Interactive activities foster connections among employees. Overall, Day 1 sets the stage for success, equipping newcomers with the knowledge and tools needed to thrive in their roles at UConn Health.
- 8:30 AM1hCWP Summer InstituteNo meetings Sat or Sun. No meetings for 4th of July weekend.
- 11:00 AM1hBusiness Career Development Office | Drop-In HoursVirtual drop in hours (https://career.business.uconn.edu/undergraduate/appointment/) are Monday-Friday via Nexus. You can also make an appointment (https://career.business.uconn.edu/undergraduate/appointment/) with one of our career counselors or email your career questions to recruit@business.uconn.edu. (mailto:recruit@business.uconn.edu)
- 11:00 AM1hBusiness Career Development Office | Drop-In HoursVirtual drop in hours (https://career.business.uconn.edu/undergraduate/appointment/) are Monday-Friday via Nexus. You can also make an appointment (https://career.business.uconn.edu/undergraduate/appointment/) with one of our career counselors or email your career questions to recruit@business.uconn.edu. (mailto:recruit@business.uconn.edu)
- 11:00 AM1hBusiness Career Development Office | Drop-In HoursVirtual drop in hours (https://career.business.uconn.edu/undergraduate/appointment/) are Monday-Friday via Nexus. You can also make an appointment (https://career.business.uconn.edu/undergraduate/appointment/) with one of our career counselors or email your career questions to recruit@business.uconn.edu. (mailto:recruit@business.uconn.edu)
- 12:00 PM1hCAM Presentation: Jinhong DongCAM Presentation Speaker: Jinhong Dong Title: TBD Via Webex: https://uconnhealth.webex.com/meet/pmendes (https://uconnhealth.webex.com/meet/pmendes)
- 12:05 PM45mGroup Fitness Class – Gentle Yoga (45)For the full class schedule, descriptions, and to register, please visit the UConn Recreation website (https://recreation.uconn.edu/group-fitness-schedule/).
- 12:20 PM50mSummer Talk Series - Katie HallTBD
- 2:00 PM1hDoctoral Dissertation Oral Defense of Justin FurunessPlease attend: Doctoral Dissertation Oral Defense Title: Securing BGP ASAP: ASPA and other post-ROV policies Ph.D. Candidate: Justin Furuness Major Advisor: Dr. Amir Herzberg Associate Advisors: Dr. Bing Wang, Dr. Ghada Almashaqbeh Date/Time: Friday July 12th 2PM 2024 Location: ITE201 WebEx Meeting LineL https://meetingsamer41.webex.com/meetingsamer41/j.php?MTID=me9cba4aa1f391c40b1225841520e5313 Meeting number: 2553 067 2425 Password: pgMGEhKr968 (74643457 when dialing from a video system) Abstract: Before the adoption of Route Origin Validation (ROV), prefix and subprefix hijacks were the most effective and common attacks on BGP routing. Recent studies indicate that ROV adoption is increasing; with sufficient adoption, prefix and subprefix attacks become ineffective. We study this changing landscape and, in particular, the Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) proposal, which focuses on route leakage but also thwarts some BGP attacks. Using recent measurements of real-world ROV adoption, we evaluate its security impact. Our simulations show a substantial impact; already today, prefix hijacks are less effective than origin hijacks. Therefore, we expect attackers to shift to origin hijacks and other post-ROV attacks. We present extensive evaluations of the impact of ASPA, comparing it to alternatives such as BGPsec, Path-End, OTC, and EdgeFilter. We assess the defense against multiple post-ROV attacks, including a novel attack, neighbor spoofing, which is extremely powerful if not blocked. We show that ASPA significantly protects against post-ROV attacks, even with partial adoption—contrasting with BGPsec. However, interestingly, we find that ASPA is not better than OTC at preventing unintentional route leaks. The ASPA proposal presents a scenario where ASPA fails, involving a provider AS attacking an AS in its customer cone. We show that ASPA can similarly fail against an edge attacking AS. We present a possible fix; however, we also demonstrate that the fix does not significantly improve ASPA's defenses against a random attacker.
- 2:00 PM1hDoctoral Dissertation Oral Defense of Justin FurunessPlease attend: Doctoral Dissertation Oral Defense Title: Securing BGP ASAP: ASPA and other post-ROV policies Ph.D. Candidate: Justin Furuness Major Advisor: Dr. Amir Herzberg Associate Advisors: Dr. Bing Wang, Dr. Ghada Almashaqbeh Date/Time: Friday July 12th 2PM 2024 Location: ITE201 WebEx Meeting LineL https://meetingsamer41.webex.com/meetingsamer41/j.php?MTID=me9cba4aa1f391c40b1225841520e5313 Meeting number: 2553 067 2425 Password: pgMGEhKr968 (74643457 when dialing from a video system) Abstract: Before the adoption of Route Origin Validation (ROV), prefix and subprefix hijacks were the most effective and common attacks on BGP routing. Recent studies indicate that ROV adoption is increasing; with sufficient adoption, prefix and subprefix attacks become ineffective. We study this changing landscape and, in particular, the Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) proposal, which focuses on route leakage but also thwarts some BGP attacks. Using recent measurements of real-world ROV adoption, we evaluate its security impact. Our simulations show a substantial impact; already today, prefix hijacks are less effective than origin hijacks. Therefore, we expect attackers to shift to origin hijacks and other post-ROV attacks. We present extensive evaluations of the impact of ASPA, comparing it to alternatives such as BGPsec, Path-End, OTC, and EdgeFilter. We assess the defense against multiple post-ROV attacks, including a novel attack, neighbor spoofing, which is extremely powerful if not blocked. We show that ASPA significantly protects against post-ROV attacks, even with partial adoption—contrasting with BGPsec. However, interestingly, we find that ASPA is not better than OTC at preventing unintentional route leaks. The ASPA proposal presents a scenario where ASPA fails, involving a provider AS attacking an AS in its customer cone. We show that ASPA can similarly fail against an edge attacking AS. We present a possible fix; however, we also demonstrate that the fix does not significantly improve ASPA's defenses against a random attacker.